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The title of our panel is, “Where We Are and How we Got Here.”  My task 
is to explain “how we got here,” while the rest of the panel will explore where 
we are—that is, how well or poorly the federal guidelines system is working.  
The last panel of the day, of course, is “Where Should We Go From Here?”  
Inevitably, that question is going to be addressed, explicitly or implicitly, 
throughout the day. 
Senator Kennedy introduced in 1977 the bill that would become the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.1  Its intellectual progenitor was Marvin E. 
Frankel, a distinguished federal judge in New York, who, in the early 1970s, 
had written a scathing attack on judicial sentencing discretion.2  Frankel and 
other liberal reformers conceived of this first version of the Sentencing Reform 
Act as an anti-imprisonment and anti-discrimination measure.  An adjunct to 
federal criminal code reform, the 1977 bill directed sentencing authorities to 
consider mitigating or aggravating personal characteristics of the defendant, 
encouraged alternatives to imprisonment, and recognized significant judicial 
discretion to depart from administrative sentencing guidelines.3 
Senator Kennedy reintroduced his bill in each of the next four Congresses.4  
As the mood and concerns of the country changed, so did the provisions of this 
bill.  Senator Strom Thurman became a co-sponsor and later on so did Senators 
Hatch and Biden.5  The bill was ultimately enacted in 1984 as part of an 
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 1. S. 1437, 95th  CONG., 1st SESS. (1977). 
 2. See generally MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 
(1973). 
 3. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh,  The Politics of Sentencing Reform:  The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 237-51 (1993). 
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important criminal measure which included, in other provisions, significant 
mandatory minimum statutory sentences.  Over the course of the four 
Congresses, the sources of plasticity in the early bill dissipated. 
Whatever the early proponents of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines may 
have expected, the ultimate sponsors of the legislation clearly desired 
guidelines that were largely binding and sentences that were harsher than past 
practice.  Many provisions of the statutes strongly encouraged certain policy 
choices that the first Sentencing Commission made, including its deviation 
from past sentencing practice for most crimes and its determination to issue 
detailed guidelines. 
Since this conference will also consider state sentencing guidelines, it is 
worth mentioning that the transformation of Senator Kennedy’s bill on the 
federal level is similar to what happened to state criminal justice legislation 
during these years.  One political scientist who studied several states including 
California and Illinois, described the evolution of sentencing bills during this 
time as follows:  “Due process liberals” initially sought to entice “law and 
order conservatives” to join with them on the theory that conservatives were 
equally dissatisfied with the regime of sentencing discretion, albeit for 
different reasons. 6 
The enticement worked, compromises were made, and in the end, the 
liberals were hoisted on their own petard.  The new sentencing regimes were 
more responsive to a concern with overly lenient sentences by soft-hearted 
judges than they were to due process concerns or overall sentencing 
disparaties.  Whatever one’s view of the wisdom of the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984, the guidelines that were promulgated in 1987, which continue in their 
essential structure today, are generally consistent with the terms of that statute 
and with its legislative history. 
At the same time, however, the Sentencing Reform Act could have been 
implemented differently.  Today’s newly appointed Commission has statutory 
authority to implement the Sentencing Reform Act with less rigidity, less 
complexity, and a significantly larger nod to the exercise of guided judicial 
discretion supplemented with appellate review.7  Specifically, the Commission 
is not statutorily compelled (1) to implement such an expansive concept of 
“real offense” sentencing, (2) to incorporate statutory, mandatory minimum 
sentences in the way that the current guidelines do, or (3) to require a motion 
from the government before a court may depart downward for substantial 
assistance to law enforcement authorities.8  And, certainly, the Commission is 
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 8. See id. 
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not required to proclaim that most individual characteristics of defendants are 
largely irrelevant to sentencing.9 
Having recounted, however briefly, “how we got here,” let me end my 
initial remarks by describing in very general terms some broader and important 
features of the Guidelines. 
It seems to me there are three fundamental characteristics of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines which, when taken together, are of great significance 
not just for criminal sentencing but for the entire system of federal criminal 
law. 
First, we have to understand that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not 
in any sense advisory.  They are binding, mandatory rules which may be 
departed from only pursuant to the rules themselves. 
Second, these rules are not determined by elected representatives through 
the process of legislation, but instead are promulgated by a central bureaucratic 
agency.   
Third, the rules take into account an enormously wide variety of criminal 
conduct beyond the statutory elements of the offense of conviction. 
Putting these three features together means that the Guidelines effectively 
operate as a criminal code in their own right, supplementing statutory criminal 
prohibitions.  This is a significant change in our common-law tradition. 
There are two especially striking aspects of this criminal code, as opposed 
to the federal criminal law of the proceeding 200 years.  First, this code is 
remarkably complex.  As a practical matter, I wonder whether much of the 
complexity and detail of the Guidelines is necessary or helpful to the 
participants in criminal sentencing. 
Second, this code is, formally at least, a closed system.  I suspect that 
actual criminal sentencing is far more porous than the Guidelines would admit.  
Surely the Guidelines do not openly acknowledge the extent to which the 
formal demands of law are inevitably tempered in implementation.  I venture 
to hypothesize that in many cases, in many districts of the country, the formal 
requirements of the Guidelines are met only on paper, not in reality, because to 
a large extent the Guidelines have driven underground the adversarial 
bargaining process and sentencing judges’ own efforts to ensure a just 
sentence. 
I hope that the new Commission will thoughtfully reconsider both the 
complexity and the rigidity of the present Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The 
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rule of law cannot prevail unless it is open to the possibility of correction, 
adjustment, and more complete justice. 
 
